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Abstract:  In recent  years,  the growing  interest  of academics  and policymakers  in
govemance  has been  reflected  in the proliferation  cross-country  indices  measuring
various  aspects  of governance.  In this paper  we explain  how a simple  variant  of an
unobserved  components  model  can  be used  to combine  the information  from these
different  sources  into  aggregate  govemance  indicators.  The main  advantage  of this
method  is that it allows  us to quantify  the precision  of the both individual  sources  of
governance  data  as well as the aggregate  governance  indicators.  We illustrate  the
methodology  by constructing  aggregate  indicators  of bureaucratic  quality,  rule of law,
and  graft,  for a large  sample  of 160 countries. Although  these  aggregate  governance
indicators  are more  informative  atbout  the level  of governance  than any individual
indicator,  the standard  errors  associated  with  estimates  of govemance  are still large
relative  to the units  in which  governance  is measured.
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In recent  years,  the growing  interest  of academics  and policymakers  in the
extent,  causes  and consequences  of governance  and misgovemance  has been  reflected
in the proliferation  of cross-country  indicators  of various  aspects  of governance.  In an
accompanying  paper  (Kaufmann,  Kraay,  Zoido-Lobat6n  (1999))  we present  a large
database  compiling  several  hundred  cross-country  indicators  of various  aspects  of
governance,  produced  by thirteen  clifferent  organizations,  and covering  178 countries.
These  indicators  report  subjective  perceptions  on a wide  range  of issues  relating  to
govemance,  ranging  from the extent  to which  corruption  in the political  system  affects
foreign  investment,  to the efficiency  of public  services  delivery,  to the likelihood  that
citizens  of a country  resort  to extrajudicial  means  to settle  disputes.
In this paper,  we take the view  that many  of these  indicators  serve  as imperfect
proxies  for one of a much  smaller  number  of fundamental  concepts  of governance.
Given  this view,  there  are  considerable  benefits  from combining  related  indicators  into  a
small number  of aggregate  governance  indicators.  First,  the aggregate  indicators  span
a much  larger  set of countries  than  any  individual  source,  permitting  comparisons  of
govemance  across  a broad  set of countries.  Second,  aggregate  indicators  can  provide
more  precise  measures  of governance  than individual  indicators. Third,  it is possible  to
construct  quantitative  measures  of the precision  of both  the aggregate  govemance
indicators  and their  components,  allowing  formal  testing  of hypotheses  regarding  cross-
country  differences  in governance
We realize  these benefits  by constructing  aggregate  governance  indicators  using
an unobserved  components  model. This model  expresses  the observed  data  as a linear
function  of unobserved  governance  plus a disturbance  term capturing  perception  errors
and/or  sampling  variation  in each indicator.  The main  advantage  of this method  is that it
allows  us to obtain  estimates  of the variance  of this disturbance  term  for each indicator.
These  can be  interpreted  as a measure  of how  informative  each indicator  is about  the
broader  concept  of governance  it measures.  We then  compute  the mean  of the
conditional  distribution  of govemance  given  the observed  data  for each country  as a
natural  point  estimate  of the level  of governance  in that country. Similarly,  the variance
1of this conditional  distribution  provides  a natural  estimate  of the precision  of this
aggregate  governance  measure  for each  country.
We illustrate  our approach  with reference  to three  fundamental  aspects  of
governance:  rule of law,  government  effectiveness,  and graft. We group 31 indicators
constructed  in 1997  and/or 1998  into  three  clusters  corresponding  to these  three
concepts  of governance,  and compute  aggregate  indicators  spanning  166, 156  and 155
countries  respectively.  In our  companion  paper  documenting  the governance  database,
we construct  similar  indices  for several  other  aspects  of governance.
Although  the unobserved  components  methodology  we use is quite  standard,  we
find its application  to the construction  of composite  govemance  indicators  interesting.'
One of our  major  findings  is that the aggregate  governance  indicators  we construct  are
rather  imprecise,  despite  the high  correlations  observed  between  various  sources  of
governance  data.  In particular,  a 90% confidence  interval  around  the point  estimate  of
governance  for a typical  country  spans  almost  the entire interquartile  range of the
distribution  of estimated  govemance.  This implies  that although  it is possible  to robustly
identify  twenty  or so countries  with the best and  worst  govemance  in  the world,  it is
much  more  difficult  to identify  statistically  significant  differences  in govemance  among
the majority  of countries.
Our results  are based  on three  key assumptions:  (1) that the measurement  errors
in individual  indicators  of govemance  are uncorrelated  across  indicators;  (2) that the
relationship  between  unobserved  govemance  and observed  indicators  is linear,  and (3)
that the distribution  of unobserved  governance  across  countries  is normal.  Relaxing  the
first assumption  is difficult  to do in practice,  simply  because  without  this assumption  we
cannot  determine  whether  the correlation  of observed  scores  across  indicators  is merely
due to correlated  perception  errors  or whether  it reflects  the common  concept  of
governance  being  measured. However,  under  the likely  altemative  that perception
errors  are correlated  across  sources,  the measures  of precision  we report  will be biased
downwards.  As a result,  the standard  errors  we report  should  be interpreted  as a lower
bound  on  the precision  of aggregate  govemance  indicators. We consider  the
1Unobserved  components  models  were  pioneered  in economics  by Goldberger  (1972),  and  the closely-
related  hierarchical  and  empirical  Bayes  models  in statistics  by Efron  and  Morris  (1971,  1972).
2consequences  of relaxing  the second  assumption  by proposing  a method  which  simply
aggregates  the ordinal  information  across  indicators.  Although  this has  the advantage  of
simplicity  and does not require  assumptions  of linearity,  it is also much  less  precise  than
the unobserved  components  method  since it discards  the cardinal  information  in the
data. The third assumption  of a normal  distribution  for unobserved  governance  implies
that our  estimates  of governance  will be  clustered  around  the mean of this distribution.
This raises  the possibility  that the!  difficulty  in distinguishing  between  countries  is in part
driven  by this assumption.  We therefore  explore  the robustness  of our results  by
considering  altematives  to this assumption,  and  find that our conclusions  are materially
unaffected  by our assumptions  on the shape  of the distribution  of unobserved
govemance.
These  findings  have  several  implications  for policy  and empirical  research  on the
causes  and consequences  of governance  for economic  development.  At a basic  level,
the finding  that governance  is imprecisely  measured  should  warn against  taking  too
seriously  the exact  point estimates  of govemance,  as well as country  rankings  based  on
these  estimates.  At best,  it is possible  to sort countries  into  broad  categories  according
to their levels  of governance,  and even  then  there  is considerable  uncertainty  regarding
the category  to which  many  countries  should  be assigned.  To emphasize  this point,  we
avoid  discussions  of specific  countries  in this paper. Second,  since available  indicators
of governance  are noisy measures  of "true"  govemance,  empirical  work  which  uses
these  indicators  as explanatory  variables  may  well underestimate  the impact  of
-governance  due  to the usual  attienuation  bias  caused  by badly-measured  right-hand  side
variables.  Since  our methodology  allows  us  to quantify  the measurement  errors  in these
2 variables,  it is possible  to obtain  rough  measures  of the extent  of this attenuation  bias.
Finally,  our  results  suggest  that if we want  to more  precisely  differentiate  among
countries  according  to their leveil  of governance,  we need  to improve  the quality  and
quantity  of data  gathered  on  governance.
The remainder  of this paper  proceeds  as follows. In Section  2, we motivate  the
empirical  work  which  follows  by describing  the indicators  of governance  we use  to
2 In  our  companion  paper  we explore  this  idea  in more  detail,  using  cross-country  regressions  of  per  capita
income  on  various  governance  measures  instrumenting  for  govemance  using  measures  of  the  linguistic'
composition  of  the  population  - in  the  spirit  of  Hall  and  Jones  (1999).
3illustrate  our ideas. In Section  3, we lay out and implement  the unobserved  components
framework  for estimating  governance,  and present  the main results  in Section  4.  In
Section  5, we discuss  the consequences  of relaxing  several  of the assumptions
underlying  the model.  We conclude  with  a discussion  of the implications  of our findings
for research  and policy  advice  regarding  governance.
42.  Indicators  of Governance
In this paper,  we use data  frorn  31 different  indicators  of governance  constructed  in
1997  and/or  1998. These  indicators  are drawn  from 13  different  sources  and are
grouped  into  three  clusters  corresponding  to rule of law,  government  effectiveness,  and
graft. The key features  of these  indicators  are summarized  in Table 1, and a detailed
description  of the sources  and  variables  can  be found  in Kaufmann,  Kraay  and Zoido-
Lobat6n  (1999). In the first two columns  of Table I we identify  each source  of
governance  data  by abbreviation  and by name. In the next  three  columns,  we report  the
source  of information  for each measure  (surveys  of residents  or polls of experts),  the
country  coverage,  and a measure  of the extent  to which  the sample  of countries  covered
by each indicator  is representative  of the population  of countries  in the world. In the
remaining  columns  we report the specific  concepts  measured  by each source  in each of
the three  clusters.  3
A quick  look at Table 1 shows  that these  indicators  differ along  several  dimensions.
First,  even  within  clusters  there  is considerable  variation  in the particular  concept
measured  by each  indicator. For  example,  questions  about  graft range  from the
incidence  of "improper  practices'  (WCY)  to the likelihood  that additional  payments  are
required  to "get  things  done"  (WDR). Similarly,  questions  regarding  the rule of law range
from  whether  citizens  can  successfully  sue  the state  to whether  citizens  are likely  to
resolve  disputes  extra-judicially.  Despite  this heterogeneity,  we take  the view  that within
each cluster,  each  of these  concepts  is an imperfect  indicator  of the corresponding
broader  concept  of governance.
The second  respect  in  which  these  indicators  differ is in the nature  of the
respondents  who provide  the information. Slightly  less  than half  of the indicators  are
surveys  of businesspeople  and/or  residents  of a country,  while  the remaining  indicators
are polls  of experts  who rate a set of countries  according  to various  criteria. As we
discuss  in more  detail  later  in the paper,  this difference  between  these  two types  of
3 For a number  of these  sources,  we use  the average  of several  questions  relating  to the corresponding
core  concepts  of  govemance.  As we discuss  subsequently,  we are  reluctant  to include  individual  questions
from  a single  source  separately  in our  analysis,  as the necessary  assumption  that measurement  errors  are
uncorrelated  across  indicators  is much  more  difficult  to support  for the case  of multiple  questions  from a
single  source.
5indicators  has implications  for how  we interpret  the error  terms in the relationship
between  observed  indicator  scores  and the underlying  concepts  of governance.
The third  respect  in which  these indicators  differ  is in the sample  of countries  they
cover. A number  of indicators  cover  a very large  and broad  sample  of developed  and
developing  countries  (EIU,  DRI, HFWSJ,  PRS  and  WDR),  while  others  cover  very
narrowly-focused  samples  of countries  (PERC  for Asia, CEER  and FHNT  for transition
economies).  Some  indicators  cover  primarily  developed  countries  but also include  major
developing  countries  (WCR,  GALLUP,  BERI). This  difference  between  indicators  is
perhaps  the most  important  for the empirical  work  which  follows. There  is by now
considerable  evidence  that govemance  on average  tends  to be better  in richer  countries.
This implies  that the distribution  of governance  is likely  to be very  different  in indicators
which  cover  sets of countries  with different  average  income  levels. These  differences
need  to be  taken  into account  when placing  the observed  data  from various  indicators
into common  units  and combining  them  into  aggregate  govemance  indicators.
In order  to distinguish  between  indicators  in this dimension,  we construct  a simple
coverage  index  which  measures  differences  between  the distribution  of countries  across
income  and regional  classifications  and the distribution  of all countries  in the world
across  these  categories.  In particular,  we divide  the world into  a two-way  classification
by region  and income,  following  the World  Bank's  1998  World  Development  Report. For
each  of the sources  of govemance  data,  we report  one-half  of the sum of absolute
-deviations  between  the share  of countries  in each of the 45 region/income  categories  in
that source  and in the world  as a whole. By construction,  this measure  ranges  from zero
to one,  with  low values  indicating  more  representative  indicators.  We report  this number
in the fifth column  of Table 1. The  five indicators  covering  the largest  number  of
countries  (DRI,  EIU,  HF, PRS  and  WDR) are  substantially  more  representative
according  to this measure  than  the others,  with a value  of the coverage  index  of less
than 0.25. In our subsequent  empirical  work  we will refer  to these  as representative
indicators,  and the remainder  as non-representative  indicators.
Finally,  we note  that each  of these  sources  of governance  data  uses  different
units  to measure  governance.  Most  polls of experts  report  discrete  categorical
responses  (e.g.  the prevalence  of corruption  on an integer  scale  from one to four),  while
6for most  surveys  of citizens  or entrepreneurs  we have  the mean response  across
respondents  of discrete  categorical  scores. We re-orient  data  from each source  so that
higher  values  correspond  to better  outcomes  (i.e. stronger  rule of law, more  effective
govemment,  and less  graft). In addition,  we rescale  each indicator  by subtracting  the
minimum  possible  score  and dividing  by  the difference  between  the maximum  and
minimum  scores,  so  that each indicator  is on a possible  scale  from zero  to one. Since
we rescale  each  indicator  using  the  maximum  and minimum  possible  scores  (rather  than
the maximum  and minimum  actual  scores  in the sample  of countries  covered  by each
indicator),  this is nothing  more  than  a convenient  choice  of units.
In Table  2, we report  the pairwise  correlations  among  indicators  within  each of the
three  governance  clusters. The  great  majority  of these  are positive  and substantial,
frequently  greater  than  0.6. In the empirical  work  which  follows,  we will interpret  these
large  correlations  within  clusters  as reflecting  the common  component  of govemance in
these  indicators. It is interesting  to note  that despite  the strong  pairwise  correlations
among  these  indicators,  and despite  the favourable  interpretation  that these correlations
reflect  the common  component  of governance  rather  than  correlated  perception  errors,
we nevertheless  find that governance  is not very  precisely  measured.  We provide  some
intuitions  for this in the following  section.
73. Estimating  Governance
In this section  we interpret  the data  as being  generated  by an unobserved
components  or multiple-indicator  model  in which  the observed  data  on governance  can
be expressed  as a linear  function  of unobserved  governance  plus a random  error  term.
We review  the well-known  features  of this model,  and propose  a simple  extension  which
delivers  consistent  parameter  estimates  for representative  as well as non-representative
indicators.  We then  describe  how  the parameters  of this model  can be estimated  and
can  be used  to construct  estimates  of each of the three  aspects  of govemance  in each
country.
The Model
Our data  consists  of clusters  of indicators  of three  aspects  of governance  - rule
of law,  government  effectiveness,  and  graft. Let  go)  denote  an unobserved  index  of one
of these  three  aspects  of governance  in country  j, for example,  graft. The observed  data
on graft  consists  of a cluster  of k=1,...,K  indicators,  each one providing  a numerical
rating  of some  aspect  of graft  in each  of the j=1,..,J(k)  countries  covered  by that
indicator. We assume  that we can  write  the observed  score  of country  j on indicator  k,
y(j,k),  as a linear  function  of unobserved  governance,  go), and a disturbance  term,  eo,k),
as follows:
(1)  y(j,k) = a(k) + 1(k).  (g(j) + F(j,k))
where  a(k) and ,B(k)  are unknown  parameters  which  map  unobserved  governance  go)
into  the observed  data  yo,k). We assume  that go)  is a random  variable  with mean  zero
and variance  one.  Our objective  is to summarize  our knowledge  about  go)  for each
country  j using  the distribution  of go) conditional  on  the observed  data  yo,k),  k=1,...,Ko)
for country  j.  The mean  of this conditional  distribution  provides  a natural  estimate  of the
level  of govemance  in country  j, and  the variance  of this conditional  distribution  is a
natural  measure  of the precision  of this indicator  of governance.  The assumption  of a
zero mean  and unit  variance  for governance  is an innocuous  choice  of units required  to
identify  the parameters  a(k) and ,B(k).  Since  we will allow  the variance  of the error  term
8to vary across  indicators  k, the fact  that P(k)  multiplies  the error  term is an innocuous
rescaling  which  slightly  simplifies  some  of the expressions  which  follow.
We use  this unobserved  components  model,  which  treats unobserved
govemance  as a random  variable  rather  than  as a fixed  parameter  to be estimated,  for a
pragmatic  reason. We will shortly  also assume  that the variance  of the disturbance  term
e(j,k)  may  differ across  indicators.  In this case,  we cannot  treat the ga)s  as fixed
parameters  to be estimated  for each  country, since  individual  effects  are not identified  in
a fixed  effects  model  with heteroskedastic  disturbances. 4 Moreover,  it should  be clear
from Equation  (1) that naive  aggregates  such  as a simple  average  of rescaled  indicators
for each country  will not result  in sensible  estimates  of govemance,  as long  as the
parameters  a(k) and ,3(k)  differ across  indicators  and different  countries  appear  in
different  sets of indicators.  It is also not possible  to remove  the dependence  of the
observed  data on  these  nuisance!  parameters  by standardizing  (i.e. by removing  the
sample  mean  from each indicator,  and dividing  by the sample  standard  deviation).  This
is because  if indicator  k is non-representative,  the sample  mean  will reflect  not  only a(k),
but also  the mean  of go) in the sample  of countries  covered  by indicator  k. Even  if an
indicator  is representative  in the sense  that the standard  deviation  of unobserved
governance  is equal  to  one in the sample  of countries  it covers, the sample  standard
deviation  of observed  scores  will reflect  not  only ,8(k),  but also  the standard  deviation  of
the disturbances.
The disturbance  term s(j,k)  captures  two sources  of uncertainty  in the relationship
between  true governance  and  the observed  indicators. First,  the particular  aspect  of
governance  covered  by indicator  k is imperfectly  measured  in each country,  reflecting
either perception  errors  on the part  of experts  (in  the case  of polls  of experts),  or
sampling  variation  (in  the case  of surveys  of citizens  or entrepreneurs).  Second,  the
relationship  between  the particular  concept  measured  by indicator  k and  the
corresponding  broader  aspect  olF  governance  may be imperfect. For example,  even  if
the particular  aspect  of graft covered  by some  indicator  k, (such  as the prevalence  of
4 To  see  this,  consider  the  special  case!  where  a(k)=O  and  13(k)=1  for  all  indicators.  We  can  make  the
likelihood  function  of  the  observed  data  arbitrarily  large  simply  by  estimating  go)  as  the  observed  score  on  a
particular  indicator,  for  example  ga)=y(j.K),  for  every  country  j, and  setting  cr(K)=0.  Kiefer  (1980)  provides  a
detailed  discussion  of  this  point.
9"improper  practices")  is perfectly  measured,  it may  nevertheless  be a noisy indicator  of
graft if there  are differences  across  countries  in  what "improper  practices"  are
considered  to be.
We assume  that the disturbance  term has zero  mean,  E[Eo,k)1=O;  has  the same
variance  across  countries  within  a given indicator  but a different  variance  across
indicators,  E[gj,k) 2]=ao(k) 2; and is independent  across  indicators  and countries,
E[E(,k)gj',k')]=O  if j#j' or k￿k'.  The variance  of the error  term can  be interpreted  as a
measure  of how informative  indicator  k is about  go), and is likely  to vary across
indicators.  The assumption  that the errors  are  independent  across  indicators  is a strong
one,  but unfortunately  one that is also  difficult  to relax.  Intuitively,  without  this
assumption  we cannot  identify  whether  the correlation  of scores  between  two indicators
is due  to their common  component  of governance  go),  or whether  it simply  reflects  the
correlation  of errors.  In contrast,  this identifying  assumption  maintains  that all of the
correlation  of scores  across  indicators  is attributable  to their  common  estimate  of
govemance.  We will consider  the consequences  of relaxing  this assumption  in the
following  section. For now,  we simply  note  that this identifying  assumption  corresponds
to a "best  case"  scenario  regarding  the precision  of govemance  aggregates,  since  it
assumes  that each  indicator  provides  independent  information  on a particular  aspect  of
governance.  As a result,  we are if anything  likely  to overstate  the precision  with which
governance  is measured.
The parameters  c(k) and P(k)  map unobserved  govemance  into  the observed
data. Although  all of our indicators  (after  rescaling)  are nominally  in the same  units  and
are measured  on a scale  from zero  to one,  there  are nevertheless  three  reasons  why
these parameters  may differ  across  indicators. First,  not  all indicators  use  the entire
range  of possible  scores. For example,  although  WDR  measures  perceptions  of graft on
a scale  from one to six, the lowest  observed  score  is only 2.36. This suggests  that a(k)
on this indicator  may  be greater  than  that of an indicator  such  as EIU  which uses  the full
range  of possible  scores. Second,  a given  indicator  might  be 'easy" ("tough")  relative  to
other  indicators  in the sense  that it tends  to overestimate  (underestimate)  a particular
aspect  of governance  in countries  where  it is in  fact low (high). This would  be reflected
in a relatively  high (low)  value  of a(k) on that indicator.  Third,  consider  a non-
representative  indicator  that covers  a set of countries  in which  the average  level  of a
10particular  aspect  of governance  is better  than  in the world  as a whole  (e.g. BERI,  which
covers  primarily  developed  countries). Suppose  further  that this source  tends  to score
countries  relative  to each other,  so that the worst  (best)  country  in the sample  receives
the lowest  (highest)  possible  score?  of zero (one). This  would  be reflected  in a relatively
high  value  of ,8(k),  since relatively  small  differences  in true govemance  are magnified
into  relatively  large  differences  in observed  scores.
The  Conditional  Distribution  of Governance
Our objective  is to summarize  our knowledge  about  governance  in each country  j
by the distribution  of governance  conditional  on the observed  data  in country  j.  This  task
is greatly  simplified  by assuming  that both  g() and the disturbances  so,k) are  jointly
normally  distributed. In this case,  go) and  y(,k), k=1,...,Ko)  are  jointly normal,  and  the
conditional  distribution  of g() given  the data  is also normal,  with mean and variance
given by:.
(3)  VE[(g)ly(j)]  = 1y-  -c
where  y() is a Kj)xl  vector  which  stacks  the K(j) data  points  for country  j, a is the
corresponding  K()xl  vector  of a(k)s, B and , are K&)xK()  diagonal  matrices  with  the
corresponding  ,B(k)s  and a,(k) 2s on  the diagonal,  and  t  is a K()xl  vector  of ones.  We
refer  to the conditional  mean in (2) as the estimated  value  of that aspect  of govemance
in country  j.  With a slight abuse  of terminology,  we refer  to an interval  from the (o/2)t
percentile  to the (1-8/2)th  percentile  of the conditional  distribution  of go)  as an o-percent
"confidence  interval"  around  this estimate,  and  we refer  to the square  root  of the
conditional  variance  in (2) as the "standard  error' of this estimate. 5
5 This  framework  has  a distinctly  Bayesian  interpretation.  The  distribution  of  go) conditional  on the observed
data  yj) can be viewed  a posterior  distrlibution,  and  the mean  of this  distribution  as an estimator  of g() would
be  justified  as a point  estimate  of go)  by a quadratic  expected  posterior  loss  function. Similarly,  the
"confidence  interval'  is analogous  to a Bayesian  highest  posterior  density  interval.
11These  expressions  have  a very natural  interpretation.  If the parameters  a(k),
,(k) and acn(k) 2 were known,  a sensible  way  to estimate  go)  would  be to rescale  the
observed  scores  by subtracting  a(k) and dividing  by ,B(k),  and then construct  a weighted
average  of these  re-scaled  scores. In particular,  let 9(j,k)  = 1 k)  (  - g(j)  + e(j,  k)
P(k)
denote  the rescaled  value  of y(,k). Then  the conditional  mean  in (2) is a weighted
average  of these  standardized  scores  for country  j on each of the KG)  indicators  in which
it appears,  with  weights  corresponding  to the inverse  of the variance of the error  term on
each  indicator,  i.e.
E[(j)jy(j)]  t(k)  *(j,k)  The conditional  variance  is simply
k=  1 +  E  a  (k) -2
k=1
(  K(j)
V[g(j)ly(j)J  =  (1+  (k)- 2 ),  which  is decreasing  in the number  of indicators
k=1
available  for that country,  K(), and is increasing  in the variance  of the error  term in each
of these  indicators,  ue(k) 2.
Estimating  the Unknown  Parameters
In order  to implement  (2) and (3), we need  to first estimate  the unknown
parameters  a(k), P(k)  and o,(k) 2 for every  indicator  k. For  the set of representative
indicators,  we can use  the assumption  of normality  of go)  and so,k)  to write  down  the
likelihood  function  of the observed  data. Provided  that we have  at least  three  such
indicators,  the model  is identified  and it is straighfforward  to maximize  this function  with
respect  to the a(k)s, P(k)s, and  cre(k) 2S  to obtain  estimates  of the unknown  parameters
for the representative  indicators. 6
6 Although  maximum  likelihood  estimation  of these  parameters  requires  the assumption  of normality,  it is
also possible  to dispense  with  this assumption  and  apply  a method  of moments  procedure.  In  the just-
identified  case of  three indicators,  these  methods  lead  to identical  parameter  estimates.  In  the overidentified
case of more  than  three  indicators,  these  methods  differ  only  in the weights  applied  to the various  moment
conditions,  and in practice  this makes  little  difference  for the parameter  estimates.
12We cannot  apply  this method  to non-representative  indicators.  To see why,
consider  the maximum-likelihood  estimate  of a(k), which unsurprisingly  is the mean
score  across  countries  on indicator  k. It is straightforward  to see  from Equation  (1) that
the expected  value of the sample  imean  of scores  on indicator  k is a(k) + ,B(k)  * g(k),
where g(k) denotes  the average  level  of governance  in  the sample  of countries  covered
by indicator  k. For  representative  indicators,  our choice  of units  for governance
normalizes  g(k) = 0.  However,  for a non-representative  indicator  where  the average
level of govemance  is different  from the world  as a whole, g(k) ￿  0 and the sample
mean  does  not provide  a consistent  estimate  of a(k).
We can nevertheless  obtain  consistent  estimates  of the unknown  parameters  by
using  the following  simple  argument. If go) were observable,  we could estimate  a(k),
P3(k)  and aj(k)  for any  indicator  by regressing  the observed  scores  y(,k) on go).
Although  go)  is itself  not observable,  we do have an estimate  of go)  based  on the
representative  indicators. In partilcular,  let g*() denote  the mean  of go)  conditioning  only
on the data  from the representative  indicators.  We can  decompose  this conditional
mean into  observed  governance  go) plus its deviation  from the mean u0), i.e.
g*()=go)+uo)  Since  u0)  is independent  of go), we can  view g*o) as measuring  go)  with
error, i.e. as a classic  errors-in-variables  problem. It is well-known  that OLS estimates  of
,8(k)  from a regression  of y(,k) on g*() will produce  downward-biased  estimates  due  to
the usual  attenuation  bias imparted  by measurement  error  in g*(). In particular,  the
probability  limit of the OLS  slope  coefficient  is 1,(k)  - V  *  A  WI  . Since  the variance
of uO)  is simply  the variance  of the conditional  mean  of go)  given  in Equation  (3), and
since V[g*0)]  is observable,  we can  correct  the OLS coefficients  for this attenuation  bias
to arrive  at consistent  estimates  of the parameters  of the non-representative  indicators. 7
7 An altemative  approach  to the problem  of non-representative  indicators  would be to impute  data  for the
missing  observations  (in the spirit  of Rubin  (1987)).  We do not pursue  this  approach  here simply  because  it
is difficult  to specify  the key  ingredient  of the imputation  process  - the conditional  distribution  of the
unobserved  data  given  the observed  data  - in our  application.
13It is worth  noting  that this estimation  method  urewards  conformity",  in the sense  that
indicators  that are highly  correlated  will have  low estimated  variances  and hence  will be
perceived  as more precise. Given  our  assumption  that the disturbance  terms  are
independent  across  indicators,  it makes  sense  to treat highly  correlated  indicators  in  this
way. If on the other  hand  indicators  are  correlated  simply  because  their  disturbances
are correlated,  this interpretation  would  be inappropriate.  We take this issue  up in more
detail  in Section  4, and argue  that it will result  in even less  precise  estimates  of
govemance  than  those  we obtain  here.
144.  Results
In this section  we implement  the unobserved  components  model  laid out in the
previous  section  for three concepts  of governance:  government  effectiveness,  rule of
law,  and graft. We first present  estimates  of governance  and associated  standard  errors
for each  country,  and  then consider  the consequences  of these  standard  errors  for
identifying  cross-country  differences  in govemance.  We conclude  with a simple  example
which  relates  the pairwise  correlations  observed  among  individual  governance  indicators
directly  to the measures  of precision  of the aggregate  indicators.
Estimates of Governance
Our main  finding  is that thoa  available  data  do not permit  very precise  estimates  of
governance.  We illustrate  this point  in Figure  1. In each of the three panels  of Figure  1,
we order countries  on  the horizontal  axis  by their  estimate  of governance,  and on  the
vertical  axis  we plot  the corresponding  point  estimate  of governance,  i.e. the conditional
expectation  of go)  given  the observed  data  for country  j, and a 90-percent  confidence
interval  around  this point  estimate,  i.e. the 5t and 95t percentiles  of the conditional
distribution  of governance  for each  country  j.  The size  of these  confidence  intervals
varies  by country,  reflecting  the fact  that different  countries  appear  in different  numbers
of sources,  and that different  countries  appear  in different  sets sources  of differing
precision.  To provide  a sense  of the dispersion  in  the point  estimates  of governance,  the
three  horizontal  lines  in each  graph  delineate  the quartiles  of the distribution  of the point
estimates  of governance  for each cluster.
The most  striking  feature  of Figure  1 is that these  confidence  intervals  are large
relative  to the units  in which  governance  is measured.  For example,  for a typical  country
the standard  deviation  of the conditional  mean  of rule of law or graft is around  0.3, so
that a typical  90% confidence  interval  extends  0.5 above  and below  the point  estimate  of
graft. In the case  of government  effectiveness,  the standard  deviation  of the conditional
mean  is on average  slightly  larger  and equal  to 0.33,  so that a 90% confidence  interval
extends  0.55 above  and below  the point  estimate  of rule of law. These  confidence
intervals  are large  in  the sense  that they are  comparable  in size  to the entire  interquartile
range  of the distribution  of estimates  of governance.  Moreover,  it should  be noted  that
15these  confidence  intervals  do not reflect  the sampling  variation  in the point estimates  of
the unknown  parameters  a(k), ,8(k)  and  a.(k). If this uncertainty  were also taken  into
account,  the standard  errors  would  be even  larger.
The parameter  estimates  reported  in Table 3 reveal  some  interesting  differences
across  indicators.  To interpret  the estimates  of the a(k)s and f3(k)s,  note that our
assumption  of a standard  normal  distribution  for governance  implies  that the vast
majority  of countries  wili have  govemance  ranging  from -2 to 2. Since  the observed
data range  from zero  to one,  one might  expect  that a representative  indicator  would
have  a(k)=0.5  and ,(k)=0.25. Interestingly,  there  are significant  departures  from this
benchmark.  Several  indicators  (e.g.  WDR)  have  estimated  values  of o(k) substantially
lower  than  this benchmark,  and higher  values  of a(k), indicating  that they do not use  the
entire range  of possible  scores. There  is also  a great  deal  of variation  in the estimates
of the standard  deviation  of the errors  on each  individual  indicator,  c6(k), suggesting  that
the precision  with  which  individual  sources  measure  govemance  varies  widely.
Assessing  Cross-Country  Differences  in Governance
An advantage  of this methodology  is that it permits  straighfforward  tests  of
hypotheses  regarding  cross-country  differences  in govemance.  However,  the large  size
of the confidence  intervals  documented  in Figure  1 suggests  that it will be difficult  to find
statistically  significant  differences  in govemance  between  many  pairs  of countries.  We
illustrate  this point  with  two simple  exercises.  Suppose  first  that for each  of the three
aspects  of governance,  we want  to group  countries  into  quartiles  according  to their  level
of govemance.  A natural  way to do this is to group  countries  according  to their point
estimates  of govemance,  i.e. according  to the mean  of the conditional  distribution  of
govemance  in each country. Moreover,  a natural  way  to assess  the confidence  with
which  countries  are assigned  to quartiles  is to consider  the corresponding  90%
confidence  intervals  shown  in Figure 1. In particular,  if the 90% confidence  interval  for a
country  falls  entirely  within  a given  quartile,  the probability  that this country  in fact
belongs  in another  quartile  is less  then 10%. For a small  group  of countries  at each end
of the distribution  of governance,  we can conclude  with a great  deal of confidence  that
these  countries  are in fact in the top and bottom  quartiles. However,  for the middle
16quartiles  the situation  is much  less  clear,  as very  few countries'  90% confidence  intervals
lie entirely  within a given  quartile,  for each of the three  aspects  of govemance.
Clearly,  the number  of countries  we can assign  to a particular  quartile  using  this rule
depends  on the size  of the confidence  interval. If we instead  consider  shorter
confidence  intervals,  such  as 75%  or 50%  intervals,  we can better  discriminate  among
countries,  albeit  with  lower  confidence.  We explore  this possibility  in Table 4, where  we
report  the proportion  of all countries  for which  an  x% confidence  interval  falls entirely
within  the indicated  quartile,  for the three  govemance  aggregates  in tum. We consider
three possibilities,  x=90%,  x=75%  and x=50%. At all significance  levels,  a substantial
fraction  of countries  in the top and bottom  quartiles  can  be clearly  identified  as belonging
in these  groups. As the size  of the confidence  interval  declines,  more  and more
countries  can  be significantly  assigned  to quartiles. Nevertheless,  even  at very  low
significance  levels,  only one-quarter  to one-half  of the countries  in the middle  two
quartiles  have  confidence intervals  lying  entirely  within  their respective  quartiles.
A related  issue is the significance  of pairwise  differences  in governance.  In
particular,  for every  pair of countries  in which  our point  estimate  of governance  in
country  j is greater  than in country j', we can investigate  the hypothesis  that country  j in
fact has better  govemance  by computing  the probability  that g(j)>g(').8 For countries
with similar  point estimates  oF  govemance,  this probability  will be close  to 0.5,  while  for
countries  far apart  in the distribution  of govemance,  this probability  will approach  one.
-To  illustrate  this point  systematically,  for each  country  j in the sample,  we compute  the
probability  that, conditional  on the observed  data  for countries  j and  j',  g(j)>g(j')  for every
comparator  country  j'. We then  compute  the proportion  of comparator  countries  for
which  this probability  is betwesen  5% and 95%. This is analogous  to counting  the
number  of comparator  countiries  for which  a conventional  test at the 10%  significance
level  of the null hypothesis  that govemance  is the same  in these  two countries  cannot  be
rejected.  We summarize  the results  of these  pairwise  comparisons  in Figure  2.  We
again  order  countries  in ascending  order  according  to their point  estimates  of
governance  on  the horizontail  axis,  and we plot  this proportion  of comparator  countries
8 Since  the ga)ly() and  g(')ly(') are  jointly  normal  and  independent  by  assumption,  this  calculation  involves
a straighfforward  integration  of  the area  under  a bivariate  normal  probability  density  function.
17as dark  points  on the vertical  axis. We also repeat  the exercise,  but instead  report  the
larger  proportion  of countries  for which  this probability  is between  25% and 75%,  which
corresponds  to a test at the 50%  significance  level. This proportion  is shown  as a light
dot in Figure  2.
Not surprisingly,  at the two ends  of the distribution  there  are significant  differences
between  the level  of govemance  in these  countries  and most other  countries,  especially
at the 50% significance  level.  However,  there  is also a strong  inverted  U-shaped  pattem
in this graph,  reflecting  the fact  that a large  fraction  of countries  are clustered  near  the
middle  of the distribution  of estimated  govemance,  and it is relatively  difficult  to
distinguish  among  such  countries. In particular,  for the "typical"  country  around  the
middle  of the distribution  of govemance,  govemance  is not significantly  different  from
nearly  half of all other  countries  in  the world, at conventional  significance  levels.
Intuitions
Our finding  that governance  is imprecisely  measured  is somewhat  surprising.
After all, in Section  2 we documented  that fact that  the pairwise  correlations  among
various  governance  indicators  are  substantial,  and  the identifying  assumption  of
independent  errors  across  indicators  implies  that the only source  of this observed  high
correlation  among  indicators  is the unobserved  common  component  of governance.
One might  therefore  easily  conclude  that  govemance  is quite well measured  and that it
is straightforward  to distinguish  among  countries'  govemance  using  this data. We now
illustrate  why this intuition  is misleading,  unless  the correlations  in the observed  data  are
very high  indeed.
As a specific  example,  suppose  that there  are only  three representative
indicators  associated  with a particular  governance  concept,  i.e. K=3,  and that the
pairwise  correlations  among  the observed  scores  are all equal  to p. It is straightforward
to show  that in  this case,  the estimated  variance  of the residual  will be a  (k) 2 =P
18for each of the surveys  k=1,2,:3.9  Inserting  this into  Equation  (3),  the variance  of the
aggregate  governance  indicator  based  on this hypothetical  data  will be the same  for
each  country  and is equal  to V[g(j)l (  =  y  1  +2  . To give an idea  of the magnitude
of the corresponding  90% confidence  intervals,  we superimpose  them on the
hypothetical  distribution  of governance  in the upper  panel  of Figure  3, for various  values
of p. As p increases,  the confidence  intervals  become  shorter. However,  for the
correlations  of around  0.75  typically  observed  in our  governance  data,  this confidence
interval  remains  large  relative  to the units  in which  govemance  is measured.
In the lower  panel  of Figure  3, we relate  this to the significance  of cross-country
comparisons.  A simple  summary  statistic  is the proportion  of countries  whose  true level
of governance  lies within  the 90%  confidence  interval  of a particular  country. This
proportion  will depend  on  the location  of the reference  country,  and on the correlations  in
the observed  data. We plot  tliis proportion  for the median  country  and  the country  at the
first quartile  of the distribution  of govemance,  for various  values  of p. For the observed
correlation  of indicators  of around  0.75,  the 90%  confidence  interval  around  the point
estimate  of govemance  for the median  country  encompasses  the true level  of
governance  in about  half  of all other  countries  in the world, and somewhat  less  for a
country  at the first  quartile. Only  if the observed  correlations  are very  large is it possible
to distinguish  the median  country  from most other  countries  with a high  degree  of
confidence.
9 To  see  this,  it  is only  necessary  to  solve  the  system  of  nine  equations  relating  the  three  sample  means  and
the  six  unique  elements  of  the  sample  covariance  matrix  of  the  indicators  to  their  population  counterparts
and  solve  for  the unknown  parameters.
194. Extensions
In this section  we consider  how our results  depend  on  three assumptions
underlying  the unobserved  components  model  of the previous  sections:  that the
disturbances  are independent  across  indicators,  that the mapping  from unobserved
governance  into observed  data  is linear,  and that the distribution  of unobserved
governance  is normal. We find  that the first two assumptions  if anything  overstate  the
precision  with  which  govemance  is measured.  Relaxing  the third assumption  does not
materially  affect  our results.
Correlated  Disturbances
In the previous  section  we assumed  that the disturbances  Eo,k)  were
independent  across  indicators. Intuitively,  this assumption  allowed  us to attribute  all of
the observed  correlation  of scores  across  indicators  to the common  component  of
governance  go), and hence  permitted  us  to identify  the portion  of the variation  in scores
across  countries  within  each  indicator  due to measurement  error. A consequence  of this
assumption  is that any  indicator  which  is not very correlated  with the others  was
interpreted  as having  a large  residual  variance.
Although  useful,  the assumption  that the errors  are independent  across
indicators  may not be valid,  for at least  three  reasons. First,  in the case  of polls  of
experts,  it is possible  that the perceptions  of experts  who rank  countries  on a particular
indicator  are influenced  by their  knowledge  of countries'  rankings  on other indicators.
Second,  the errors  in surveys  of residents  might  be correlated  across  countries  if
residents  of a particular  country  have  a tendency  to systematically  overstate  regulatory
and govemance  obstacles,  due to a broad-based  predisposition  to report  a worse
situation  than is objectively  warranted.1 0 Finally,  it is possible  that perceptions  of
governance  from various  indicators  are unduly  influenced  by a single  event,  such  as a
high-profile  scandal  which  is not representative  of the level  of graft in that country.
10  See  Kaufman  and  Zoido-Lobat6n  (1999).
20Although  it is not possible  to statistically  identify  the correlation  of the
disturbances  across  sources,  it is straighfforward  to see  the consequences  of positively-
correlated  errors  for our results.  If the errors  are  correlated  across  indicators,  each
additional  indicator  contributes  less  information  to our  estimate  of governance.  This  will
be reflected  in  the variance  of the conditional  distribution  of governance  in each  country.
In particular,  it is straightforwaird  to show  that holding  constant  the variance  of the
residuals  on each indicator,  the variance  of the condition  al distribution  of govemance  is
increasing  in the correlation  between  the errors  on any  two indicators. 11
We illustrate  the practical  consequences  of this observation  in Table 5. For each
of the three  aggregate  indicators,  we re-estimate  the variance  of the conditional
distribution  of govemance,  imposing  a range  of assumptions  on the correlation  of the
disturbances.  For the purposes  of this example,  we restrict  ourselves  to a set of three
representative  indicators  (EIU,  DRI  and PRS),  and also  to the set of about  100 countries
which appear  in all three  indicators.12  As the assumed  correlation  among  the errors  rises
from 0 to 0.5,  the aggregate  govemance  indicators  become  less  precise,  although  the
magnitude  of the effect  depends  on  the indicator  (since  the estimated  variances  of the
disturbances  change  as well). In the case  of government  effectiveness,  the standard
error  of the aggregate  increases  only slightly,  from 0.32  to 0.35. In contrast,  for rule of
law the standard  error  doubles  from 0.33  to 0.66.
It is difficult  to adequately  address  the problem  of correlated  disturbances  simply
because  it is not possible  to separately  identify  the correlations  between  the errors.
Nevertheless,  it is useful  to realize  that the estimated  standard  errors  associated  with
point  estimates  of governance  are  likely  to be substantially  understated  under  the
assumption  of independent  errors. This reinforces  our argument  of the previous  section
that cross-country  comparisons  of the level  of governance  should  be made  with caution.
11  If the positive  correlations  between  the residuals  differ  across  pairs  of indicators,  the relative  magnitudes
of the estimated  variances  will also  be affected.  In particular,  suppose  that  two indicators  of bureaucratic
quality  are  highly  correlated  with each  other,  but not  very correlated  with  the third. In  the previous  section
we assumed  that  the errors  were  iindependent,  and so  the high  correlation  between  the first two indicators
implied  that the variance  of  the errors  was  small  on these  indicators  relative  to  the third. However,  if we
knew  that the high  correlation  between  the  first two  indicators  was due  to correlated  errors,  then  the
estimated  variances  on these  indicators  would  be large  relative  to that of  the third  indicator.  As a result,  the
relative  rankings  of countries  might  also  be affected.
12We do this  only  for simplicity,  since  it allows  us to report  just  one standard  error  per aggregate,  which  is
the same  for all countries.
21Non-Linearities
In the previous  section  we assumed  that the relationship  between  unobserved
governance  and observed  indicator  scores  was linear. This assumption  places  strong
restrictions  on the units  in which  governance  is measured  in the various  indicators  in our
sample. For example,  consider  an indicator  such  as Gallup  which  asks respondents
how many  cases  of corruption  there  are among  public  officials,  and offers  the choice  of
four broad  categories:  'none",  "a few",  "many"  and "a lot". Our observed  data  consists  of
numerical  scores  on a scale of one to four corresponding  to these  categories.  The
assumption  of a linear  mapping  from unobserved  graft into  observed  scores  implies  that
the difference  in graft between  a country  with a score  of 4 and one with a score  of 3 (i.e.
the difference  between  "a lot" and umany"  cases  of corruption)  rs  the same  as the
difference  between  two countries  with scores  of 3 and 2 (i.e.  the difference  between
"many"  and 'a few"). Given  the somewhat  vague  response  categories,  it is not at all
clear  that the assumption  of linearity  is warranted.  Moreover,  even if these categories
were equally-spaced  according  to some  appropriate  metric,  the fact that the observed
data  are discrete  while  our unobserved  govemance  indicator  is continuous  violates  the
assumption  of a linear  relationship  between  the two. 13
Finally,  the mere  fact  that indicators  are non-representative  may also contribute
to a non-linear  relationship  between  governance  and observed  scores. A number  of the
indicators  in our sample  cover  primarily  developed  countries  together  with  a few
developing  countries. It is possible  that the developing  countries  in these  indicators
suffer  from a "curse  of inclusion"  in the sense  that they receive  worse scores  than  they
might  otherwise  have received  simply  because  they are  implicitly  being  compared  with
countries  in which  various  aspects  of govemance  are likely  to be much  better.1 4 For
example,  representative  surveys  such  as DRI or PRS  assign  moderate  scores  of 55/100
13The straighfforward  solution  to this  problem  would  be to rely on an ordered  multinomial  choice  model  with
individual  effects  in the latent  variable. HoWever,  for such  a model  to be identified,  it would  again  be
necessary  to assume  that  the variances  of the errors  are identical  across  indicators.
14  This problem  may  be particularly  acute  for polls  of experts  who  consider  a large  set  of countries  at  once,
since  in contrast  to surveys  of residents,  experts  are much  more  likely  to be aware  of relative  comparisons
of countries.
22and 3/6 to Mexico  for graft,  while  on a much  less  representative  survey  such as BERI
which  covers  primarily  developed  countries,  Mexico  receives  a rather  poor rating  of 1/7.
What  can be done  about  these  non-linearities?  A very  general  solution  to this
problem  might  be to combine  only the ordinal  information  in each indicator,  i.e. the
relative  rankings  of countries  within  each indicator. In particular,  one can  think of a given
indicator  as providing  a ranking  of pairs  of countries  according  to their level  of
governance.  The information  in the relative  rankings  of countries  from various  indicators
can  then be combined  by noting  that if several  indicators  consistently  rank  country  A as
having  better  govemance  than  country  B,  this provides  evidence  that governance  is in
fact better  in country  A than in country  B. Clearly,  this approach  has  several  advantages.
First,  it is computationally  very simple. Second,  we do not have  to know  the choice  of
units  in which  governance  is measured  , or whether  indicators  are representative  or not.
Third,  it does not require  any  assumption  of linearity  in  the relationship  between
governance  and observed  scores. However,  this method  will result.in  larger  standard
errors  for pairwise  comparisons  since it discards  information  in differences  in the level  of
scores  across  countries  and indicators.15
To illustrate  the relative  imprecision  of such  an ordinal  aggregate,  for every  pair of
countries  j and  j' on every  indicator  k,  we construct  an indicator  variable  x0j,j',k)  which
takes  the value 1 if country  j is ranked  higher  than country  j' with respect  to the aspect  of
governance  covered  by indicator  k, and zero  otherwise.16  A natural  null hypothesis  to
test is that governance  in countries  j and  j' is the same,  i.e. that the probability  x(,j',k) is
equal  to one is 0.5. Under  the assumption  that the errors  are independent  across
15  A further  drawback  of  this method  is that  it is difficult  to construct  an aggregate  ranking  of countries
according  to governance.  One possibility  would  be to average  the indicator  variables  x0,j',k)  over  all surveys
k and  partner  countries  j', and rank  oDuntries  according  to this index.  However,  it is difficult  to put standard
errors  on such  a ranking,  since  even  if the errors  are  independent  across  surveys,  the x(,j',k) will not be
independent  across  partner  countries  j'.  A deeper  problem  with  this method  is  that there  is a fundamental
result  from  social  choice  theory  which  places  strong  restrictions  on the  properties  such an aggregate  ranking
may  have.  According  to Arrow's  Impossibility  Theorem,  it is impossible  for any aggregation  of each
indicators'  'preferences" to simultaneiously  satisfy  three  intuitive  and  desirable  properties:  (i) the aggregation
respects  unanimity  -- if every  indicator  says  that  A is more  corrupt  than B,  then  so should  our  aggregate,  and
(ii) the aggregation  displays  the independence  of irrelevant  alternatives  property  -- the ranking  of  A and  B
does  not depend  on any indicators'  ranking  bf  A or B relative  to any  other  country  C; and (iii)  the aggregation
is non-dictatorial  - the aggregate  ranking  of  A and  B is not uniquely  determined  by a single  indicators
ranking  of  A and B. In particular,  Arrow's  theorem  tells  us that if (i) and  (ii) hold,  then  (iii)  does  not hold.
16  For  those  surveys  which  report  discrete  categorical  scores,  we discard  'ties" as uninformative  about  the
relative  level  of govemance.
23indicators,  this hypothesis  can be  tested  using  the data  on  the proportion  of indicators  in
which country  j is ranked  higher  than country  j' in a simple  binomial  proportions  test.
We report  the results  of this exercise  in Figure  4, which  is analogous  to Figure  2.
We again  order  countries  in ascending  order  according  to their  point estimates  of
govemance  on the horizontal  axis, and we  plot  the proportion  of all comparator  countries
for which  the null hypothesis  that governance  in these  two countries  is equal  cannot  be
rejected  at the 10%  significance  level  as dark  dots on  the vertical  axis. The light dots
report  the same  information,  but at the 50%  level. Comparing  Figures  2 and 4, it is clear
that the ordinal  aggregate  allows  use  to identify  far fewer  statistically  significant
differences  in govemance  across  countries.  In fact,  for many  countries  it is impossible  to
reject  the null at the 10%  level  that govemance  in  this country  is the same  as for every
other  country  in the world  using  this method! Although  this ordinal  method  is a useful
vehicle  for making  rough  comparisons  across  countries  and requires  little in the way of
assumptions  on the underlying  data, it is much  more  difficult  to obtain  statistically
significant  differences  among  countries.
Alternative Distributions for Governance
In Section  2 we assumed  that unobserved  govemance  and the disturbances
were  jointly normally  distributed.  As we noted,  this assumption  has  a significant  payoff
in terms of analytical  tractibility,  as it ensured  that the distribution  of govemance
conditional  on the observed  data  was  normal,  with  simple  expressions  for its mean  and
variance. However,  given  the bell-shape  of the normal  distribution,  this approach
embodies  the implicit  assumption  that a relatively  large  fraction  of countries  in the world
have  similar  moderate  levels  of governance,  and relatively  few have  either very  good  or
very  bad governance.  There  are  two reasons  to question  this assumption. First,  it is not
at all clear  a priori that this provides  an accurate  depiction  of the true cross-country
distribution  of governance.  Second,  it is possible  that our  finding  that it is difficult  to
statistically  distinguish  differences  in governance  between  a large  proportion  of countries
in the world  is accentuated  by the assumption  of normality,  which  forces  a
disproportionate  fraction  of countries  to be clustered  near  the mean  of the distribution  of
governance. If instead  we assumed  that governance  was more  dispersed,  then it is
24possible  that it is easier  to identify  statistically  significant  differences  in governance
across  countries.
It is not clear how  one might  identify  the shape  of the true distribution  of
governance  across  countries,  since  it is difficult  to disentangle  the shape  of this
distribution  from  the shape  of the distribution  of the error  terms. However,  it is possible
to explore  the robustness  of the results  to different  choices  for the distribution  of
governance  itself. We do this by instead  assuming  that unobserved  governance  follows
a Beta[a,b]  distribution.  We consider  three  choices  of parameters  corresponding  to
three  very different  shapes  of the possible  distribution  of govemance. These  three
possibilities  are  illustrated  in  the left-hand  column  of Figure  5. We first consider  a=b=5,
which  generates  a symmetric  bell-shaped  distribution.  This case  serves  as a benchmark
in that it is very  similar  to the normal  distribution  we have  been  using  so far. We also
consider  the possibility  that the distribution  of govemance  is skewed  to the right  (a=2,
b=5),  with relatively  few countries  with  very good  governance  in the right  tail of the
distribution.  Finally,  we consicder  the possibility  that govemance  is uniformly  distributed
(a=b=1),  with a similar  proportion  of countries  at each  possible  level  of govemance.  We
continue  to assume  that the diistribution  of the disturbances  is normal.
On the right-hand  side of Figure  5, we explore  the consequences  of these
alternative  assumptions  for our  conclusions  about  the significance  of cross-country
differences  in govemance.  As a specific  example,  we focus  on an aggregate  of the
three  largest  representative  indicators  of graft (EIU,  DRI  and PRS),  and again  restrict
ourselves  to the sample  of about  100 countries  appearing  in all three  indicators. For
each country,  we report  the point  estimates  and standard  errors  corresponding  to each
assumption  on  the distribution  of governance. 17 As the assumed  shape  of the
distribution  of true governance  changes,  not surprisingly  so does the distribution  of point
estimates. The more  important  observation  is that our results  on the difficulty  of
distinguishing  between  countries  do not change. It is clear  from Figure  5 that the
17 We compute  these  as  follows. First,  using  a method  of moments  argument  we construct  estimates  of the
parameters  of the model  corresponding  to the assumed  distribution  of govemance  (note  that  the mean  and
variance  of this  beta  distribution  change  as  we vary  the parameters).  We then  construct  the  joint distribution
of  go)  and  y() as  the  appropriate  mixture  of  a normal  and  a beta  distribution,  and  then  obtain  the  marginal
distribution  of yj) and  conditional  distribution  of go)  given  yG)  by  appropriate  numerical  integrations  of this
joint distribution.  We numerically  evaluate  the mean  of  this distribution,  and  the 5e and  95  percentiles,  and
report  these  for each  country  in Figure  5.
25number of countries with 90% confidence intervals falling entirely within particular
quartiles is essentially unchanged for each quartile, as we vary our assumptions on the
shape of the distribution of govemance.
265. Conclusions
In this paper,  we have  talken  the  view  that the many  different  available  indicators
of governance  provide  imperfect  signals  about  a relatively  small  number  of fundamental
aspects  of governance,  such  as rule of law,  govemment  effectiveness,  and graft. We
grouped  the many  available  indicators  into  three  clusters  corresponding  to these
concepts  of governance,  and used  a linear  unobserved  components  model  to obtain
aggregate  estimates  of these  three  aspects  of govemance.  Despite  several  optimistic
assumptions,  we find that govemance  is not very precisely  measured  using  these
aggregate  indicators. In particular,  although  it is possible  to identify  statistically
significant  differences  between  countries  at opposite  ends  of the distribution  of
govemance,  it is much  more  difFicult  to discriminate  among  the majority  of countries  with
any degree  of confidence.
Nevertheless,  we  find the aggregate  governance  indicators  to be useful  for
several  reasons. First,  they are'  based  on a methodology  which  provides  a consistent
framework  for placing  data  from  various  sources  into common  units,  taking into  account
that the samples  of countries  included  in different  sources  may not be representative  of
the world as a whole. Second,  the aggregate  indicators  span a much  larger  sample  of
155 or more  countries,  permitting  (admittedly-imprecise)  comparisons  across  a much
larger  set of countries  than  is possible  using  any single  indicator. Third,  although  the
aggregate  indicators  are not as precise  as one might  have hoped,  they are nevertheless
much  more  reliable  than  any individual  indicator. Finally,  we believe  that it is useful  to
have  quantitative  measures  of the precision  of aggregate  indicators  in order  to caution
users  of both  individual  and aggregate  indicators  of the substantial  margins  of error
associated  with cross-country  comparisons  of govemance.
Empirical  research  on governance  issues  can  also benefit  from the aggregate
indicators  presented  here. Many  empirical  studies  which  use govemance  indicators  as
either  left-hand  or right-hand  side variables  are limited  to small  samples  by the poor
country  coverage  of many  indicators.  This can  potentially  introduce  a variety  of sample
selection  biases. In addition,  the measures  of precision  we report  can be used  to correct
for the attenuation  bias  due to measurement  error  in govemance  indicators  used  as
dependent  variables.
27In the long  term,  however,  our results  also  point to the inadequacy  of existing
governance  measures.  jt is very unsatisfying  that existing  data,  even  with favourable
assumptions,  allows  us to identify  relatively  few statistically  significant  differences  in
governance  across  countries. Moreover,  existing  data  provides  at best  tenuous  links
between  perceptions  of govemance  and objective  policy  interventions  that govemments
interested  in improving  the quality  of governance  can undertake.  There  is therefore  a
need  to improve  the quality  and quantity  of govemance  data,  both  by improving  and
extending  cross-country  survey  work  of govemance  perceptions,  as well as employing
country-specific  in-depth  govemance  diagnostics. 18 Many  of the polls  and surveys  we
use suffer  from deficiencies,  such  as poorly-worded  questions  about ill-defined  and
excessively  broad  concepts.  There  is room  to improve  these instruments  by asking
respondents  about  their direct  experiences  with  well-defined  events  and using
transparent  units  to measure  govemance.  However,  these  are  time- and resource-
intensive  exercises,  and intemationally-comparable  high-quality  data  of this sort is years
away.
18  Detailed  country  diagnostic  exercises  such as  those  currently  being  piloted  by  the World Bank  have  the
potential  to provide  much  more  detailed  information  on the specific  institutional  failures  which  contribute  to
perceptions  and  the reality  of poor  govemance.  Kaufmann,  Pradhan  and  Ryterman  (1998)  provide  a
description  of these  exercises.
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29Table 1:  Governance  Indicators
Code  (Sura  6e  Coe  C  eptls
cir  Pnli  (P)  12M-t
BEPI  Businoss  P  50 mostly  0.44  Buresauratic  delays  Erforceability of contracts  Mewntality"  regarding
Environment  Risk  developed  corruption
Intelligenco  countries
CEER  Central Ewopean  P  26  transition  0.84  Rule of law  Effect of conotion  on
Economic Review  economies  'attractiveness of com"tiy
as a piace to do business'
DRN  Standard and  P  106 developed  0.23  Government  ineffectiveness, Enforceability  contracts, Comuption  among pubic
Poor's DRI  and developing  instiutional hfaihe  costs of crime  officials, offectiveness  of
countries  antkorruption iitiativs
EIU  Economist  P  115developed  0.19  Insitutional efficacy, red  tape  Cme,  corruption in  Corruptionemong public
Intelligence Unit  and developing  bakng  sector  of4ciats
counties
FHNT  Freedom House  P  28 transiion  0.82  Quality of goverment  and  Rule of law  Perep,tions of corrlp,tiOn
economies  public administration  in civil service, business
interests  of polkymakers
GALLUP  Galup  S  44 mostly  0.50  Freqwency  of "cases of
Intemational  developed  corruption"ramong  public
countries  offcials
GCS  Gobal  S  59 develped  0.42  Competence of pubic  Cdizens  can file  awsuts  Frequency of "kregular
Competitiveness  and developing  sector, polrtial  pressures on  against government  payments" to officials and
Survey  countries  civi servants, time spent  citizns  acoept legal  judiiary
with tbrreauciats  e4udicln,
independence  of judiciary,
costs of crime
GCSA  Global  S  23 African  0.73  Competence Of  pblic  Citiwens  can file lawsuits  Frequency of "iregular
Competitiveness  countries  servants, commitment to  against goversnent,  paymentsW  to offiials  and
Stivey,  Afria  polices of previous  cdizens acceot legal  judiciary
govefmments  edudication,
independence  of judiciary,
costs of mime
HF  Heritage  P  160  developed  0.06  Law and order  tradition,
Foundation  and  developing  prevalence of black
countries  market activiies
PERC  Poliical and  S  12  Asian  0.83  Effect of corrupton on
Economic Risk  economies  busins  environment for
Consultancy  foreign companies
PRS  Poitical Risk  P  131 developed  0.10  Bureatic  qulaity, policy  Rule of law  Corruption  in the political
Services  and developing  stability  system  sa "threat to
countries  foreign investment"
WCY  World  S  46 primarily  0.59  Efflcien  implementation  of  Tax evasion, confidence  "Improper  pratices  in
Competitiveness  devetoped  goennrert  decisions  in atblity o ato  ties to  the publi  sptere
Yearbook  countries  political pressures on civil  protect property,
servants  confidence in
admrinistration  of justice
WDR  World  S  74 developed  0.25  Efficiency  of govemment in  Unpredictability  of the  Corruption as "obstacle to
Deveopment  and develoing  delivenrig services,  judiciary, ttheft end crime,  busine,  frequency of
Report  countries  predictabiliy of rules, time  ability of state to protect  "additiol  payments" to
spent  wih  bureaucrats  private propeity  "get things done"
Notes: Details  on these  sources  of governance  data, and definitions  of the concepts
measured,  may be  found in  Appendix  A of Kaufmann,  Kraay  and Zoido-Lobat6n
(1  999).
30Table  2: Correlations  Among  Governance  Indicators
Government  Effectiveness
gee,u  gedn  goprs  gewdr  geberi  geefint  gegcs  gogcs  gswcy
gaeiu  1.00
114
gadri  0.77'  1.00
96  106
geprs  o.60-  0.61  1.00
111  100  140
gewdr  0.78  *  0.68  0.36  1.00
58  57  65  74
gsberi  0.74  *  0.71  *  0.54  *  0.73  1.00
49  so  50  30  so
gent  066  *  0.71  024  0.62  - 0.67  1.00
19  24  21  20  6  28
gegcs  0.76  0.74  0.52  *  0.85  0.70  0.75  *  1.00
64  62  72  45  46  6  75
gagcsa  0.64  0.69  0.55  0.26  1.00  0.56  1.00
1  15  20  - 14  2  0  19  23
gewcy  0.55  0.53  0.48'  0.81  0.65  0.06  0.92  1.00
43  44  46  27  41  4  46  0  46
Rule  of Law
ddi  diu  rdMf  rIprs  rdwdr  dberi  dceer  Mint  dges  dgsa  ljz  dwqcy  iscore
rtdi  100
106
dwiu  0.73*  1.O
96  114
Mhf  0.73  0.686  1.00
105  112  16O
rtpus  0.75  0.75*  0.62  1.00
1oo'  111  137  140
dwdr  0.58  0.75  0.76  0.59s  1.00
57  58  72  es  74
rberi  0.73  0.70*  0.82*  0.62'  0.54  1.00
so  49  50  50  30  50
de  0.69  *  0.79  *  0.90  *  0.52  *  0.51  - .0.86  1.00
24  19  25  20  20  6  27
dfhrt  0.76'  0.66'  0.86  0.33  0.394  -0.75'  0.91  *  1.00
24  19  26  21  20  6  27  28
dg3  0.70*  0.768  0.78*  0.70  0.74*  0.77*  0.96  0.78  1.00
53  se  59  59  33  46  6  6  59
dugsa  0.43  031  0.03  0.27  0.61 *  -1.00  0.87  1.00
15  18  23  20  14  2  0  0  3  23
rjlkz  0.63 - 0.45  0.37  0.57  0.13  0.64  0.19  0.00  0.50  0.16  1.00
6s  73  76  74  48  44  19  20'  49  8  77
dwCy  0.63  0.73  0.77'  0.68'  0.786  0.75'  0.98'  0.94'  0.94  0.47'  1.00
44  43  46  46  27  41  4  4  46  0  40  46
drscor  1.00  0.99  0.95  0.91  0.72  0.63  0.99  0.986  0.986  . 0.37  0.96'  1.00
5  5  S  5  5  5  5  5  5  0  5  4  5
Graft
gWrd  grei  grpn  gWwdr  guSeti  grow  grit  gupilup  grgrs  grgca  gWperc  gnucy  grscore
grdri  1.00
106
greiu  0.80  100
97  115
guprs  0.65  0.64  1.00
100  112  140
grwdr  0.69e  0.80*  0.46  100
57  5s  65  74
gubiei  0.57  0.58  0.48  0.78  1.00
50  50  50  30  50
gnroer  0.91  0.76  0.68  0.56'  0.38  100
24  19  20  20  6  26
grntd  0.79  o  0.60  0.72n  0.58  0.40  0.92'  100
23  19  21  20  6  25  28
grgalkp  0.63  0.78-  0.62  0.81  0.46  - 0.71  0.69  1.00
42  42  44  26  29  9  9  44
grgcs  0.77'  0.88'  0.57  0.87  0.73'  0.98  0.80  *  0.60  1.0o
53  57  59  33  46  6  7  35  59
grgcsa  0.59  0.53 *  0.45  0.61'  1.00  . . 0.9  0.79  1.00
15  18  20  14  2  0  0  3  3  23
grperc  0.58  0.95'  0.33  0.96'  0.76'  . . 0.84'  0.89  *  1.00
12  12  12  6  11  0  0  5  12  0  12
gr*cy  0.69  0.-84  0.65'  0.93  0.62  -0.32  -0.51  0.67'  0.856  . 0.93  100
44  44  46  27  41  4  4  31  46  0  11  46
grscere  0.91  0.92'  0.82'  0.869  0.74'  0.89'  0.67'  0.73  0.82  0.64  0.82-  0.82'  1.0o
51  51  51  51  30  13  13  25  33  11  6  27  51
This  table reports  pairwise  correlations  between  govemance  indicators  within  each
govemance  cluster. The numbers  below  the correlation  coefficients  indicate  the
number  of countries  common  to each  pair of indicators.  * indicates  significance  at the
90% level.
31Table 3:  Parameter  Estimates
Govemment  Effectiveness  Rule  of Law  Graft
cx(k)  Om  oe)  a(  kfk  S  a(k)  a  (k)  _s(k)
Representative  Indicators
DRI  0.539  0.239  0.588  0.668  0.179  0.583  0.539  0.221  0.618
EIU  0.432  0.226  0.396  0.442  0.285  0.445  0.312  0.309  0.322
HF  0.466  0.247  0.751
PRS  0.789  0.109  1.222  0.606  0.220  0.656  0.506  0.142  1.129
WDR  0.473  0.097  0.685  0.354  0.135  0.681  0.465  0.150  0.636
Non-Representative  Indicators
BERI  0.406  0.133  0.707  0.404  0.136  0.687  0.483  0.173  1.226
CEER  0.604  0.380  0.303  0.615  0.359  0.356
FHNT  0.624  0.396  0.440  0.566  0.397  0.454  0.561  0.513  0.511
GALLUP  0.470  0.149  0.709
GCS  0.398  0.151  0.600  0.526  0.148  0.594  0.493  0.247  0.457
GCSA  0.470  0.112  0.450  0.499  0.041  1.695  0.498  0.297  0.406
PERC  0.302  0.299  0.270
WCY  0.307  0.120  0.906  0.382  0.156  0.580  0.212  0.284  0.498
32Table?  4: Assigning  Countries  to Quartiles
Proportion  of Countries  for Which an x% Confidence
Interval  Lies  Entirely  in the Indicated  Quartile
x=90%  x=75%  x=50%
Government  Effectiveness
First  Quairtile  0.31  0.54  0.72
Second  Quartile  0.00  0.00  0.26
Third Quartile  0.00  0.13  0.31
Fourth  Quartile  0.59  0.69  0.79
Rule  of Law
First  Quartile  0.31  0.43  0.65
Second  Quartile  0.00  0.05  0.39
Third  Quartile  0.12  0.24  0.55
Fourth  Quartile  0.55  0.63  0.84
Graft
First Quartile  0.13  0.23  0.49
Second  Quartile  0.00  0.03  0.26
Third Quartile  0.08  0.21  0.36
Fourth Quartile  0.65  0.72  0.80
This table reports the fraction of all countries whose point estimate of govemance
falls in the indicated quartile for which the corresponding x%/o  confidence interval
also falls entirely within that quartile, for each of the three govemance aggregates
and for a range of values of x.Table 5:  Consequences  of Correlated  Disturbances
Average  Standard  Error  of Govemance  Aggregate
Based  on Representative  Indicators
Assumed  Error  Correlation:
p=0  p=0.25 p=0.5
Government Effectiveness  0.32  0.31  0.35
Rule of Law  0.33  0.47  0.66
Graft  0.31  0.42  0.44
This  table reports  the standard  error  of an aggregate  indicator  (based  on a
balariced  panel  of three  sources),  under  altemative  assumptions  regarding  the
correlation  of the disturbances.
34Figure  1:  Estimates  of Governance
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Countries  are  ordered  on  the  horizontal  axis  in  ascending  order  according  to their
point  estimates  of governance,  and  their  point  estimates  and  90%  confidence
intervals  are  indicated  on  the  vertical  axis. The  horizontal  lines  delineate  the
quartiles  of the  distribution  of governance  estimates.  For  reasons  of space,
country  names  are  indicated  onily  for  every  fifth  country.
35Figure  2:  Significance  of Pairwise  Governance  Comparisons
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37Figure 4:  Significance of Pairwise  Governance  Comparisons
Based on Ordinal Method
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Countries  are  ordered  on  the  horizontal  axis  in  ascending  order  according  to their
point  estimates  of governance.  Fpr each country,  we plot  on the vertical  axis the
proportion  of all comparator  countries  for which  the probability  that govemance  in
the reference  country  is greater  than  that in the comparator  country  is either
between  5% and 95% (dark  dots), or is between  25% and 75%.  For reasons  of
space,  country  names  are indicated  only for every  fifth country.
38Figure 5:  Alternative Distributions for Governance
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The  rows  of  thi  s  figure  correspond  to the  assumptions  that  unobserved
governance  follows  a Beta(5,5),  Beta(2,5)  and  a Beta(1  ,1)  distribution.  In  the  left
column  we  show  the  shape  of  this  distribution.  In the  right  column,  we show  the
corresponding  analog  to Figure  1,  for  a governance  aggregate  constructed  using
a balanced  panel  of three  indicators  of graft.
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